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STUDENT NOTES

EVIDENCE-DEMONSTRATIONS BEFORE THE JURY
The question has often arisen as to how far one may proceed
with demonstrations in the presence of the jury before it will be
held to be prejudicial error. The general rule seems to be that
it is within the discretion of the trial court.
Demonstrations before the jury are of two kinds, personal
demonstrations and mechanical demonstrations. The purpose of
this note is to discuss the limitations and modifications placed upon
the trial court's discretion in both situations.
In personal demonstrations where the plaintiff has been injured permanently a demonstration is permissible to show the
extent and nature of the injury, unless it will arouse the passion
and sympathy of the jury so as to prejudice the opposing party
and lead to an excessive judgment.3
The cases present a wide
difference of judicial opinion as to what will create prejudice and
passion in the minds of the jurors, but the view of the majority
seems to be that if there is neither an open wound' nor a loud
exclamation of pain, the passion of the jury is not excited so as
to create prejudice. Many of these situations seem to be merely
an examination of the injuries rather than a demonstration. *
Many demonstrations as to the extent of an injury or the
capacity of an injured plaintiff to do certain things are susceptible
to the practice of deceit and fraud upon the court and, to prevent
this, the discretion of the trial court should not be loosely used.
Whenever the demonstration might possibly lead to a practice
'Willoughby v. Zylstra, 5 Cal. App. 2d 297, 42 P. 2d 685 (1935);
Ohio County Drug Co. v. Howard, 201 Ky. 236, 256 S. W. 705 (1923);
Zeller v. Mayson, 168 Md. 663, 179 Atl. 179 (1935); Posell v. Herscovitz, 237 Mass. 513, 130 N. E. 69 (1922); Hatfield v. St. Paul & D. R.
Co., 33 Minn. 130, 22 N. W. 176 (1885).
2II WIGMORE, EVIDENCE

(3d ed. 1940) sec. 445.

'Cass v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 62 S. D. 509, 253 N. W. 626
(1934).
' Willoughby v. Zylstra, 5 Cal. App. 2d 297, 42 P. 2d 685 (1935)
(not improper to permit a medical witness to manipulate fingers
on injured person's neck and to pinch injured vertebrae in presence of jury); Meyer v. Johnson, 224 Mo. App, 565, 30 S. W. 2d 641
(1930) (improper for medical witness to run fingers over injured
person's neck and to pinch injured parts of body in presence of
jury); Anthony v. Public Transit Co., 130 Atl. 895 (N. J. 1925)
(not improper to allow an attorney to stick pin in plaintiff's arm
in presence of jury); Madison Coal Corp. v. Attmire, 215 Ky, 283,
284 S. W. 1068 (1926) (improper to allow attorney to stick needle
in arm of plaintiff in presence of jury); Herter v. City of Detroit,
245 Mich. 425, 222 N. W. 774 (1929) (no error in permitting doctor.
to move plaintiff's shoulder and elbow joint by using his arm,
causing exclamation of pain in presence of jury); Peters v.Hockley,
152 Ore. 434, 53 P. 2d 1059 (1936) (error to permit doctor to raise
plaintiff's arm in presence of the jury while she cried out in pain).
'Sears v. Goldsmith, 136 Ore. 151, 298 Pac. 219 (1931).
"Peters v. Hockley, 152 Ore. 434, 53 P. 2d 1059 (1936).
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of fraud or deceit, the court, within the exercise of its discretion,
should deny the evidence by way of a demonstration. This is because it is an imposition that cannot be controverted by other proof
or by cross examination, since neither would show whether or
not the person upon whom the demonstration is being performed
is faking or exaggerating the extent of his injury. The demonstration should also be denied when the plaintiff is not under oath
8
and is not subject to cross examination, since in such a situation
the plaintiff's demonstrative testimony could be subject to exaggeration or fabrication without the plaintiff being subject to a
charge of perjury.
The courts have also said that a demonstration will not be
allowed when it is likely to cause further injury or to endanger
the health and safety of the person upon whom the demonstration
is to be made! This is a commendable modification or limitation
on the court's power, as the court should be an instrument for
the protection of the plaintiff when he seeks recovery for injuries
caused by the defendant and is likely to be subjected to a demonstration which would cause him further injury. If it were not for
this limitation, demonstrations of this type could be carried to
such an extreme that injured persons having just claims to damages would fail to prosecute those claims for fear of further ibijury
or danger.
Mechanical demonstrations are subject to somewhat different
limitations. The most common limitation on the court's discretion
in regard to such demonstrations is that the conditions at the time
of the demonstration be the same as those in the case at issue.20
However, the court carried this rule to an extreme in Daniels v.
Stock, 1 which was an action for damages for a scratch on the leg
received in a public bath. A demonstration to show that the injury
could not have been received in the way alleged was held improper
in the absence of proof of the similarity of tubs and legs. This is
one of the more amusing cases showing how far the court's discretion may go, but the other cases show the propriety of this
rule and how the court has guarded its discretion. A New York
case held that when there is a demonstration before the jury to
test by chemical application the quality and composition of the
ink on a writing which is in question, such demonstration will not
be allowed unless preliminary preparations have been made for
2
safeguarding the present actual condition of the paper offered.'
Stewart v. Weiner, 108 Neb. 49, 187 N. W. 121 (1922).
Gulf Refining Co. v. Frazier, 15 Tenn. App. 662 (1932).
'Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Williams, 177 Ky. 701, 198
8

S. W. 54 (1917).
" Spires v. State, 50 Fla. 121, 39 So. 181 (1905); Western Electric Co. v. Prochaska, 129 Ill. App. 589 (1906); Leonard v. Southern
Pacific Co., 21 Ore. 555, 28 Pac. 887 (1892).
"23 Colo. App. 529, 130 Pac. 1031 (1913).
"In re Gartland's Will, 69 Misc. Rep. 33, 112 N. Y. S. 719 (1909).
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A recent case held that a demonstration by a physician that
he could drink the same amount and same kind of ground glass
that the plaintiff allegedly drank was not proper, because the
mental reactions of the plaintiff and the physician would not be
the same after drinking the glass. This decision seems in accord
with the limitation, since the conditions under which the plaintiff
swallowed the glass and the conditions under which the physician
swallowed the glass would not be the same.11
Evidence by way of demonstrations should be received with
caution, and be admitted only when it is obvious to the court, from
the nature of the offer, that the jury will be enlightened rather
than confused.' In many instances a slight change in the conditions under which the experiment is made will so distort the
result as wholly to destroy its value as evidence and make it harmful rather than helpful. The value and weight of demonstrations
as evidence should always be left for the jury's consideration and
determination.'
In conclusion, demonstrations of both types, personal and
mechanical, should be allowed to determine a disputed fact and
to enlighten and clarify issues for the jury, (1) when it can be
done safely without danger to anyone, (2) where there is no
opportunity to perpetrate a fraud on the court and (3) when it
will not be prejudicial.
VILEY 0. BLACKBURN
PARTNERSHIPS-TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY
For many purposes, in the absence of statutes, a partnership
is not looked upon as a legal entity. It cannot sue or be sued in
its own capacity. All suits involving the partnership must be
brought by or against the individuals occupying the relation of
partners.1 On the other hand, a partnership at common law was
deemed to have some existence in itself which allowed it, as an
entity, certain rights and imposed upon it certain obligations
distinct from the rights and obligations of the individual partners.
Contracts could, for example, be made or taken in the firm name.2
This dual concept is well illustrated by the different situations
that arise in regard to the property rights of a partnership. It
is generally held that a partnership may not take, hold or convey
legal title to real property,' but a partnership may own personal
" Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Ark. v. Lanston, 198 Ark. 59, 127
S. W. 2d 263 (1939).
" Landro v. Great Northern R. Co., 117 Minn. 306, 135 N. W.
991 (1912); Sullivan v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co., 55
N. D. 353, 213 N. W. 841 (1927).
"Willoughby v. Zylstra, 5 Cal. App. 2d 297, 42 P. 2d 685 (1935).
'MEcHEM, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP (2d ed. 1920)
sec. 6.
s Ibid. at sec. 123.
'Adams v. Church, 42 Ore. 270, 70 Pac. 1037 (1902); MECHEM,
ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP (2d ed. 1920) sec. 153.

